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Abstract
We present a growth model where agents divide time between rent
seeking in the form of resource competition; and working in a human
capital sector, interpreted as trade or manufacturing. Rent seeking
exerts negative externalities on the productivity of human capital,
generating multiple steady states. Adding shocks to the model — in
the form of violence in the rent seeking process, and changes in the size
of the contested resource base — the model can replicate a long phase
with stagnant incomes and high levels of rent seeking, interrupted by
s m a l lf a i l e dg r o w t hs p u r t s ;t h i si se v e n t u a l l yf o l l o w e db yap e r m a n e n t
transition to a sustained growth path where rent seeking vanishes in
the limit. We illustrate the workings of the model with simulations
and argue that the results, and what drives them, ﬁt with some broad
historical facts about growth, rent seeking, and the so-called natural
resource curse.
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11 Introduction
A couple of hundred years ago Europe embarked on what is known as the
Industrial Revolution: it started to exhibit sustained growth in per-capita in-
comes. This came together with many other social transformations. Levels of
education started to rise, public school reforms were introduced, democracy
started to spread, voting rights were extended, the labor force moved from
agriculture to industry and from rural to urban areas, and the so-called De-
mographic Transition set in: ﬁrst mortality rates fell, and thereafter fertility
rates.
In a sense, the Industrial Revolution seems to have also brought with it
a reallocation of agents’ time and eﬀorts, away from rent seeking and into
productive activities. In pre-industrial Europe, and (to even larger extent) in
early human civilizations, those classes whose incomes were mainly based on
the land they held, or the conquest of new land — that is, the landed aristoc-
racy and the military — seem to have had higher status, power, wealth, and
incomes, than the classes who made their living from skills, rather than land.
Industrialization resulted in the rise of a skilled urban class, and the demise
of the landed aristocracy. This was reﬂected in the transition from agricul-
ture to industry, and the process of urbanization. It also ﬁts with changes
in career choices of university graduates in England around the time of the
Industrial Revolution, away from, for instance, the land-owning profession
and into more urban, high-skilled professions, such as banking (Doepke and
Zilibotti 2005, Table 2).
This paper links a growing literature on what caused the transition from
stagnation to growth to an even larger literature on rent seeking. We set up a
growth model where agents divide time between rent seeking and productive
activities. Rent seeking could be, for example, military competition for land
and other resources: that is, a pure zero-sum game. The productive activity
is one where agents use their human capital, which could be interpreted as
trade or manufacturing. The model generates an endogenous transition from
a situation where per-capita incomes are stagnant and agents spend all their
2time in rent seeking, to a path where per-capita incomes grow at a sustained
rate and rent seeking vanishes in the limit. Our results ﬁt with many stylized
facts about long-run development.
The ﬁrst important component of our model is an externality from rent
seeking on the productivity of human capital. One way to think of this is that
rent seeking can be associated with violence. When rent seeking is the most
violent — amounting to outright warfare — it adversely aﬀects, for example,
trade (see discussion later).
Another element of our model is stochastic. We consider two settings.
In the ﬁrst, we let the parameter which links rent seeking to human capi-
tal productivity be stochastic. We interpret this as the economy being hit
by violence shocks. These determine how violent forms rent seeking takes:
t h em o r ev i o l e n t ,t h ew o r s ea r et h ed e t r i m e n t a le ﬀects from rent seeking on
human capital productivity.
The central mechanism driving the results is that the economy alters its
response to the shocks over the course of development. The distribution
from which the shocks are drawn is exogenous and time-invariant, but as
rent seeking declines the economy becomes insulated from the shocks. When
human capital levels are low agents spend all their time in rent seeking so
violence shocks have devastating eﬀects; when human capital levels are high
agents spend almost no time in rent seeking so the shocks have negligible
eﬀects.
This gives rise to quite rich dynamics. The economy can be stuck for
very long in a stagnant trap with low levels of human capital and per-capita
incomes, and agents engaging only in rent seeking. Once a mild enough
violence shock arrives agents re-allocate some time away from rent seeking
into the human capital sector. Since rent seeking is a zero-sum activity, this
raises incomes of all agents. This leads to more human capital investment,
thus further mitigating rent seeking and violence also in the next period. If
the economy is spared adverse shocks for suﬃciently long it converges to a
path with sustained growth in human capital and per-capita incomes, and
3declining rent seeking. In the limit rent seeking vanishes altogether, making
the economy immune to violence shocks.
E a r l yo ni nt h i st a k e - o ﬀ, however, the economy is vulnerable, and a bad
violence shock can push the economy back into poverty. Our simulations
illustrate how an economy can go through temporary spurts — phases of
drops in rent seeking and rising human capital levels — followed a few periods
later by a reversion into full rent seeking and human capital falling back to
its earlier constant levels. This ﬁts with the observed rise-and-fall patterns
of urban and prosperous regions in European history (De Long and Shleifer
1993), as well as growth miracles and “melt-downs” in modern times.
We also consider a setting where the economy is hit by resource shocks.
These change the size of the pie that agents compete for when engaging in
rent seeking. Many of the qualitative results are the same as in the setting
with violence shocks: a long phase of stagnation and “false starts” is followed
eventually by a growth take-oﬀ and the vanishing of rent seeking; once the
economy has embarked on a balanced growth path it becomes insulated from
further resource shocks, and does not contract back into poverty.
Also in this setting the most interesting result refers to how the econ-
omy’s response to the shocks changes over the course of development. At
early stages of development, when agents spend all their time in rent seek-
ing, an increase in resources raises incomes. This is consistent with the
pattern of early human civilizations, whose prosperity depended largely on
their resource endowments. Resource depletion (man-made or otherwise) of-
ten led to their downfall: consider, for example, the Maya and Easter Island
civilizations (Brander and Taylor 1998, Diamond 2005).
When the economy has just begun to experience a growth take-oﬀ the
resource shocks have the reverse eﬀect: a positive resource shock reduces
incomes. This is because they increase rent seeking and thus lower produc-
tivity of human capital. Such detrimental eﬀects plague many countries in
the world today, which is known as the natural resource curse. For example,
oil discoveries have ruined countries like Nigeria (Sala-i-Martin and Subra-
4manian 2003).
Finally, on the balanced growth path resource shocks cease to have any
eﬀect at all, since incomes earned from resource competition come to be
dwarfed by those earned from human capital. This result is in line with
t h ef a c tt h a tr e s o u r c ee n d o w m e n t sd on o te x p l a i nm u c ho ft h ev a r i a t i o ni n
per-capita incomes between diﬀerent rich countries in the world today.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next Section 2 relates this
p a p e rt os o m ee x i s t i n gw o r k . S e c t i o n3c i t e ss o m ee m p i r i c a lf a c t st h a ta r e
consistent with our results and/or assumptions. Section 4 sets up the model
where the stochastic element comes from so-called violence shocks. Section
5 analyzes a setting where the shocks instead change the size of the resource
base. A concluding discussion is given in Section 6.
2E x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e
This paper relates to several strands of literature, much of which will be
discussed in more detail as we present the model and document some sup-
porting facts. However, to give an overview we may think of our story in
light of two broad ﬁelds of literature: long-run growth models; and models
of rent seeking and conﬂict.
The literature on long-run growth tries to explain the take-oﬀ from stag-
nation to growth that started in Western Europe a couple of centuries ago,
as well as many related changes occurring in the same process and around
the same time (Goodfriend and McDermott 1995; Tamura 1996, 2002, 2005;
Galor and Weil 2000; Jones 2001; Kögel and Prskawetz 2001; Galor and
Moav 2002; Hansen and Prescott 2002; Lagerlöf 2003a,b, 2005a; Doepke and
Zilibotti 2005; see Galor 2005 for an overview). Some of these (for instance,
Galor and Weil 2000) emphasize an element of endogenous fertility, which
we abstract from here.1 Others focus on the transition from agricultural to
1However, as discussed later, our exogenous resource shocks could be interpreted as
changes in population pressure.
5industrial production (for example, Kögel and Prskawetz 2001, Hansen and
Prescott 2002, and Tamura 2002), or the rise of an urban class (Doepke and
Zilibotti 2005); this relates more closely to the theme of this paper.
The major contribution we make to this literature is twofold. First, we
think of the transition from stagnation to growth, and from rural/agricultural
production to urban/industrial, in the context of a parallel transition away
from rent seeking and conﬂict into production based on human capital. This
brings many new insights. In particular, we argue that several results refer-
ring to rent seeking, war, and the natural resource curse are consistent with
some interesting long-run growth facts (as discussed later in Section 3).
Second, our model contains an element of stochastic shocks, the eﬀects of
which are altered endogenously in the course of development. This enables
o u rm o d e lt oe x p l a i nb o t ha ne v e n t u a lp e r m a n e n tt a k e - o ﬀ to from stagnation
to sustained growth, and several “false starts” preceding it.2
There is also a large literature on rent seeking and conﬂicts. Some early
seminal contributions include Hirshleifer (1988, 1989), Grossman (1991),
Murphy et al. (1991, 1993), Skaperdas (1991, 1992), Grossman and Kim
(1995); for a recent overview see Skaperdas (2003). We share with this liter-
ature a general idea that some resources are allocated not through trade on
markets, but rather through (potentially violent) conﬂict. One diﬀerence is
that these papers often (but not always) use static models; to explain changes
over time in rent seeking and other variables we need a dynamic model.3
2In this respect our paper shares some mechanical features with Lagerlöf (2003a,b), who
allow for stochastic shocks to population (epidemics) in a model with endogenous fertility,
to explain a transition from stagnation to growth. Likewise, Lagerlöf (2005b) allows for
war shocks in a model of resource competition and endogenous mortality. Diﬀerent from
these papers, here we endogenize the choice between rent seeking and working in a human
capital sector.
3Of course, some papers do analyze rent seeking and conﬂicts using dynamic settings:
see, for example, Murphy et al. (1991), Tornell and Lane (1999), Gonzales (2005), and
Tangerås and Lagerlöf (2005). However, these models are not designed to account for
take-oﬀs from stagnation to growth. In that respect, our model relates more closely to
the long-run growth literature cited above.
6Many of these papers model externalities from rent seeking to productive
activities, which can give rise to multiple equilibria with diﬀerent levels of
rent seeking. For example, in environments with many rent seekers producers
may face higher probability of having their output expropriated, thus making
productive activities less proﬁtable, which can sustain an equilibrium where
many agents choose to engage in rent seeking. Alternatively, entrepreneurial
activity can destroy the scope for rent seeking through various channels,
generating similar self-reinforcing mechanisms. (See, for example, Acemoglu
1995, Baland and Francois 2000, Torvik 2002, and further references therein.)
We allow for similar externalities (although in a somewhat more black-boxed
manner) and our model could in principle also generate such multiplicity (see
Footnote 7); in our dynamic setting this would correspond to indeterminate
growth paths. However, for the purpose of this paper we restrict attention
to the case where, in each period, there is only one equilibrium. Instead, we
focus on the dynamic aspects of the model and the associated multiplicity of
steady states, and the results when introducing shocks to this environment.
3 Empirical support
3.1 The transition from stagnation to growth
To simplify, one can say that in the world today Western Europe and some of
its colonial oﬀshoots have high and growing per-capita incomes; most other
countries have low and non-growing per-capita incomes. However, today’s
rich countries had stagnant per-capita incomes up until about the late 18th,
or early 19th, centuries. Over the period 1500-1820 the average per-capita
GDP growth rate for 12 Western European countries (among others, the
UK, Germany and France) is estimated to have been a modest 0.14% per
year; over the period 1820-70 the growth rate rose to 1.04%, and over the
1870-1913 period to 1.33% (Maddison 2003, Table 8b). This take-oﬀ from
stagnation to growth is commonly known as the Industrial Revolution. (See,
7for example, Galor 2005 for an overview.)
Up until not too long ago most growth models could not account for such
take-oﬀs. Rather, they would typically predict a monotonically declining
growth rate as an economy approaches its balanced growth path (conver-
gence). We thus add to a new generation of growth models where such
transitions can be explained (as discussed in Section 2 above).
3.2 Human capital is less subject to rent seeking
A central mechanism in our model is that an increase in human capital in-
duces agents to reallocate time away from rent seeking to working in the
human capital sector. For this to make sense we must assume that (income
from) human capital cannot be expropriated, or taxed. That is, rent seek-
ing is here deﬁned as competition over resources other than human capital,
typically land or natural resources.
This should not be interpreted too literally. Throughout human history
human capital has at least occasionally been heavily taxed. However, in
European history human capital seems to have been more diﬃcult for rulers
to tax than income from land, since it is more mobile. For example, in
medieval times when despotic monarchs tried to extract tax revenues from
prosperous European city states this eventually led to the cities’ decline,
and the rise of freer cities elsewhere (De Long and Shleifer 1993, De Long
2000). This mechanism also relates to migrations following religious and
minority persecution in European history. Following the pogroms during
the ﬁrst crusade and the Spanish Inquisition, literate and educated Jews
migrated to Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire, respectively, contributing
to the economic upswing of those areas (Ben-Sasson 1976). In fact, abundant
human capital may in and by itself facilitate mobility: as argued by Botticini
and Eckstein (2005, Section 7), high Jewish skill levels dating millennia back
can explain historical Jewish migrations, and Jewish Diaspora to this day. It
seems plausible that high skill levels facilitated migration among non-Jewish
people too.
8One form of rent seeking could of course be slavery, which amounts to
taxing or expropriating someone’s labor. However, this need not be the same
as taxation or expropriation of human capital. Fenoaltea (1984) argues that
slavery has mostly been used to extract low-skilled labor; high-skilled tasks
tend to be performed by free workers. In that sense, the transition away from
rent seeking in our model could at least broadly be thought of in the context
of the transition from slavery to free labor.
3.3 The rise and fall of the natural resource curse
If rent seeking is detrimental to growth, resource abundance can, by inducing
more rent seeking, delay a take-oﬀ from stagnation to growth and make
countries poorer. This is, in essence, the natural resource curse, and it seems
to describe the experience of many poor countries in the world today (see,
for example, Sachs and Warner 1995; Gylfason et al. 1999; Atay 2001; Sala-
i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Isham et al. 2005).
The existing cross-country empirical literature, however, focuses on mod-
ern times. In a historical perspective natural resources may have played the
opposite role. Humans have obviously relied on diﬀerent types of resources at
diﬀerent stages of development, but a general pattern may still be discerned.
The earliest civilizations arose in what was then the Fertile Crescent, and
forests and fertile soils have been necessary for the evolvement and survival
of many other historic civilizations. The downfall of, for instance, the Maya
and Easter Island civilizations followed the depletion of their resource bases
(Brander and Taylor 1998, Diamond 2005). That is, natural resources was
at that stage of development largely a blessing (and their depletion was the
curse).
Resource abundance started to be more of a curse concurrent with a
number of economic changes beginning in the centuries leading up to the In-
dustrial Revolution. A case in point could be Spain. Initially, the discovery
and extraction of silver and gold in the American colonies had a direct posi-
tive eﬀect on Spain’s incomes, in the sense that it enabled military expansion.
9However, in the longer run the resulting ﬁscal expansion created adverse in-
stitutional baggage, such as the practice of selling tax exemptions, which in
turn delayed Spain’s industrialization. This process has been described and
modelled by Drelichman (2005); see also Acemoglu et al. (2005). In a sense,
Spain’s windfall gains thus had opposite eﬀects in the long and short run.
Finally, among rich and growing countries in the world today natural
resources seem to be neither curse, or a blessing. In a sense, this relates to
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) who ﬁnd that the resource curse does
not apply to countries with good institutions, which typically means rich and
growing countries. Some anecdotal and casual empiricism would suggest the
same: for example, the income gap between the United States and Europe
has little to do with abundance of natural resources on either side of the
Atlantic. Resource scarcity has not prevented Luxembourg, Switzerland, or
Japan from growing rich; neither has resource abundance (in the form of, for
example, oil) been a curse for Norway or Alaska.
To sum up, our readings of the facts suggest that an abundance of re-
sources was once a blessing (in early human civilizations); later a curse (in
economies on the verge of a take-oﬀ); and eventually had little eﬀe c ta ta l l ,
positive or negative (in countries exhibiting sustained growth).
3.4 Negative externalities from rent seeking
As described already, we assume that rent seeking negatively aﬀects the pro-
ductivity of human capital. There are many ways to motivate this. One
can think of productivity of human capital as dependent on something we
could call “institutions.” Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Isham
et al. (2005) study the links between natural resource abundance, per-capita
incomes, and institutions across countries today, where institutions are mea-
sured in similar ways as in the recent related literature (for example, Ace-
moglu et al. 2001, 2002), as indices over property rights protection, etc.
They ﬁnd that the link from natural resources to economic outcomes indeed
works through institutions.
10Another motivation could be that rent seeking — in the sense of compe-
tition for land and resources — sometimes becomes violent, thus potentially
impeding activities which are based on human capital, such as trade. Look-
ing at data over trade and war across a large set of countries since 1870, Glick
and Taylor (2005) ﬁnd that wars do reduce trade (not only for belligerent
nations but also neutrals). Moreover, the negative trade eﬀects of war do not
go away when peace breaks out, but linger on long after. For example, Glick
and Taylor (2005) ﬁnd that the negative eﬀects on trade from the ﬁrst world
war continued almost into the 1930’s, and the eﬀects of the second world war
until the mid 1950’s.
4 The Model
Agents live in overlapping generations for two periods, as children and adults.
Adults consume and invest in their children’s human capital; children con-
sume nothing and are passive (other than receiving human capital investment
from their parents). Each agent has one oﬀspring so population is constant,
and population size is denoted P.
Adults earn income from two sources. They can engage in rent seeking,
here meaning zero-sum competition for a ﬁnite resource (for instance land)
which yields a ﬁxed total amount of output, A; and they can work in some-
thing which may be thought of as a trading or manufacturing, where their
pay depends on their human capital. The human capital of an agent being
adult in period t is denoted Ht.
E a c ha g e n th a so n eu n i to ft i m et od i v i d eb e t w e e nw o r k i n gi nt h eh u m a n
capital sector and engaging in rent seeking. The income earned from rent
seeking is given by a Tullock-type of contest function: an agent who spends
rt ∈ [0,1] units of time in rent seeking receives a fraction of the total pie (A)
proportional to her fraction of the total amount of time spent in rent seeking;
that fraction is given by:
rt
rt +( P − 1)Rt
,( 1 )
11where Rt is the average time spent in rent seeking among other agents, and
(recall) P is total population.4
T h en e x tc o m p o n e n to fo u rm o d e li san e g a t i v ee x t e r n a l i t yf r o mr e n t
seeking on the productivity of human capital. In this section we shall inter-
pret this externality as an eﬀect of violence in society. That is, rent seeking
can take diﬀerent forms, amounting to peaceful disputes, outright warfare,
or anything in between. The more violent forms that rent seeking takes, the
more adverse are the eﬀects on the productivity of human capital.
Moreover, in this section we let the degree of violence in rent seeking be
random. More precisely, the total amount of violence is given by Rtρt,w h e r e
(recall) Rt is the average time each agent spends in rent seeking, and ρt is a
random variable drawn independently at each t from a uniform distribution
on the interval [ρ,ρ],w h e r e0 ≤ ρ < ρ < 1. The higher is ρt the more violent
forms rent seeking takes, if any rent seeking takes place at all (that is, if
Rt > 0). If there is no rent seeking (Rt =0 ), there is no violence.
The income earned per unit of time spent in the human capital sector,
by an agent endowed with Ht units of human capital, is given by Ω(Rtρt)Ht,
where Ω0(Rtρt) < 0. We assume that Ω(0) ≡ B>0.T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n
implies that if rent seeking is eliminated (Rt =0 ) the economy becomes
insulated from violence shocks.
For the rest of this paper we shall use the following functional form, which
generates nice closed-form solutions:
Ω(Rtρt)=B (1 − Rtρt).( 2 )
Note that ρ < 1 and Rt ≤ 1 ensures that Ω(Rtρt) > 0 for all feasible Rt and
ρt.
4Formally, we may deﬁne this fraction as equal to 1/P if rt + Rt =0 ,a n da si n( 1 )
if rt + Rt > 0. As can be understood when setting up the maximization problem later,
Rt =0cannot be an equilibrium: an atomistic agent taking Rt =0as given and setting
rt =0gets a share 1/P < 1, but would grab the whole pie by instead setting rt arbitrarily
small but strictly positive.
12The total income of an atomistic agent who spends rt units of time in




rt +( P − 1)Rt
¸
A +( 1− rt)B (1 − Rtρt)Ht.( 3 )
The utility function of the same agent is given by
Ut =( 1− β)lnct + β lnHt+1,( 4 )
where ct is the adult’s own consumption and Ht+1 is the human capital
invested in the (single) child.5 Purely for simplicity we assume that one unit
of human capital is produced using one unit of the consumption good:
ct = Yt − Ht+1.( 5 )
The agent chooses Ht+1 and rt to maximize (4), subject to (3) and (5), and
the constraint that rt ∈ [0,1].6 This gives:
Ht+1 = βYt,( 6 )
and
(P − 1)RtA
[rt +( P − 1)Rt]
2 ≥ B (1 − Rtρt)Ht,( 7 )
where the weak inequality is strict if rt =1 , and holds with equality if rt < 1.
4.1 Equilibrium rent seeking
Since all agents are identical, in a symmetric equilibrium they choose the
same rt,t h a ti s :rt = Rt. As shown in Section A.1 of the appendix, (7) gives
5Letting the child’s human capital directly enter the parent’s utility function is the
easiest way to create a link from income today to human capital tomorrow. One could
alternatively assume that parents care about their children’s total income, or welfare.
However, that would greatly complicate the analysis without generating much further
insight.
6Note that agents choose rt knowing ρt, that is, either before, or simultaneously with,
the realization of ρt. This is necessary for the realization of ρt to have an impact on rt
(and thus Rt), which is a central part of our story.



























P2 .( 1 0 )
In words, b Ht is the threshold level that Ht must exceed for agents to allocate
any time at all to working in the human capital sector. This threshold is
increasing in ρt.T h a ti s ,t h em o r ev i o l e n tf o r m st h a tr e n ts e e k i n gt a k e st h e
more likely are agents to allocate all their time to rent seeking, as follows
from the productivity of human capital being decreasing in the degree of
violence.
Note that Rt is decreasing in Ht for all Ht ≥ b Ht,a n dt h a tRt goes to zero
as Ht goes to inﬁnity. That is, accumulation of human capital reduces rent
seeking by inducing agents to spend more time in the human capital sector
instead.
7As described in Section A.1 of the appendix, the quadratic equation which deﬁnes the
















However, this equilibrium (if it exists) has many peculiar features: it implies that total
violence, Rtρt, is decreasing in the violence shock, ρt;a n dt h a tRt is increasing in Ht,s o
that sustained growth in Ht makes Rt go to one rather than zero. Moreover, for ρt < 1/2
the positive root cannot be an equilibrium since that would imply Rt > 1;t h u s ,i fρ (the
upper bound for ρt)i sl e s st h a n1/2 this root can never be an equilibrium.
144.2 Income and dynamics
We can set Rt = rt in (3) to derive an expression for equilibrium income:
Yt = A/P +( 1− Rt)B (1 − Rtρt)Ht. Using equilibrium rent seeking in (8),
and the deﬁnition of γ in (10), it is shown in Section A.2 of the appendix


















if Ht ≥ b Ht
,( 1 1 )
where (recall) b Ht is deﬁned in (9), and γ in (10).
To see the intuition behind (11) it is useful to ﬁr s tc l o s ed o w nt h er e n t
seeking externality, that is, setting ρt =0 .F o r Ht above b Ht income then
becomes A/P 2 + BHt. A marginal increase in Ht thus raises income by B,
independently of how much time is spent in rent seeking. Intuitively, there
is a direct eﬀect on income while holding ﬁxed the level of rent seeking, as
given by (1 − Rt)B. There is also a time reallocation eﬀect, as given by
−(∂Rt/∂Ht)BHt.T h el a t t e re ﬀect occurs because rent seeking is a zero-sum
activity; therefore, when all agents spend less time in rent seeking everyone’s
income rises. With the functional forms used here the combined marginal
eﬀect of a rise in human capital is the same as if there was no rent seeking
at all (that is, B).8 If ρt > 0 an increase in human capital has a third eﬀect,
by reducing rent seeking and thus raising productivity in the human capital
sector.
Using the expressions for human capital investment in (6) and income in
8Using (27) in the appendix [or applying l’Hôpital’s rule to (8)] one can see that ρt =0
gives Rt = γ/(BHt). Using (3), setting rt = Rt and ρt =0 , income in equilibrium is seen
to equal Yt = A/P +( 1− Rt)BHt. It is then straightforward to verify that
∂Yt
∂Ht


























if Ht ≥ b Ht
,( 1 2 )
where (recall again) b Ht is deﬁned in (9), and γ in (10).
It can also be seen from (12) that sustained growth in Ht requires that
βB>1, which we hereafter assume holds.9
It is informative to analyze how the model behaves if ρt is held ﬁxed, at
some level ρ. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics for one numerical example
(used in Section 4.4 later), in a 45-degree diagram where ρ takes either one
of two values. For small enough ρ (such as ρ =0 .3 in this numerical exam-
ple) the economy exhibits sustained growth regardless of initial conditions.
For higher ρ (here ρ =0 .5) the economy is characterized by multiple steady
states: if the economy starts oﬀ with a human capital level above a criti-
cal point it exhibits sustained growth; if it starts oﬀ slightly below it jumps
(almost) immediately to a steady state with constant human capital. This
multiplicity hinges on the link from rent seeking to human capital produc-
tivity (as captured by ρ) being strong enough. Low levels of human capital
today means a lot of rent seeking today; the larger is ρ the more adverse are
the eﬀects from rent seeking on the productivity of human capital, and thus
on incomes today and human capital tomorrow.
4.3 Transitions
A setting where ρ is constant can thus generate underdevelopment traps
through a standard multiple steady-state story, but it fails to explain how
a prolonged period of stagnant incomes can be followed by a transition to
sustained growth. As we shall see next, letting ρt ﬂuctuate randomly can
generate such a pattern.
9That is, Ht+1/Ht goes to βB as Ht goes to inﬁnity, so if βB>1 it holds that Ht can
grow indeﬁnitely.
16Given the assumption that ρt is uniformly distributed on [ρ,ρ] it can be
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Since the distribution of ρt is time independent, so is the distribution of b Ht.






< H,( 1 5 )
where H and H are given by (13) and (14). This means that a hypothetical
economy which starts oﬀ with H0 = βA/P, and is constantly hit by the
maximum violence shock (ρ)i ss t u c ki nas t a g n a n tt r a pw i t hc o n s t a n th u m a n
capital and per-capita incomes. If the same economy is instead constantly
hit by the minimum violence shock (ρ)i tb r e a k so u to fp o v e r t ya n do n t oa
sustained growth path.
Human capital stays constant at βA/P as long this falls below the ﬂuc-
tuating threshold, b Ht.S o o n e ro rl a t e rc o m e sap e r i o dw h e nρt and thus b Ht
are suﬃciently low, so that the actual human capital level, βA/P,c o m e st o
exceed the threshold. As a result, agents start allocating less time to rent
seeking. This leads to less violence, a higher return to human capital, higher
incomes, and thus also more human capital invested in the next generation.
This in turn makes the actual human capital level in the next period more
likely to exceed the threshold realized in that period, in turn making it more
likely that human capital rises further. This creates a virtuous cycle where,
period by period, the economy reaches higher human capital levels, insulating
it from further shocks.
Early on in this take-oﬀ the economy stays vulnerable; a severe enough
violence shock can wipe out all gains and push the economy back into poverty.
17But once human capital exceeds the maximum threshold level, H in (14), the
economy can no longer fall back into the poverty trap. From there on the
economy embarks on a sustained growth path where human capital grows
indeﬁnitely, and in the limit agents spend all their time in the human capital
sector.
4.4 Simulation results
We next simulate the model. First we choose values for the exogenous para-
meters β, A, P,a n dB, and calculate the associated value for γ from (10).
We then generate a sequence of violence shocks, ρt. Setting an initial value
for human capital, H0, the algorithm is then straightforward: given ρ0 and
H0, we use (12) to compute H1;u s i n gρ1 and H1 we compute H2 the same
way; and so on. This generates a sequence of human capital stocks, which
then gives the amounts of time allocated to rent seeking in each period from
(8), and levels of income from (11).
Figure 2 shows the result of one such simulation. The parameter values
are chosen as follows: A =1 0 0 ; P =1 0 0 0 ; ρ =0 .9; ρ =0 .3; B =5 ;a n d
β =0 .346. This is one set of values consistent with (15). The choices of
B and β imply that the economy grows by 2.2% per year on the balanced
growth path, if each period corresponds to 25 years.10 Initial human capital
is set equal to its stagnant level, βA/P.
Since ρt is random no two runs are identical, but they all have the same
qualitative features. As seen in Figure 2 the economy is stuck in a stagnant
state for a number of generations (about 50 in this case), where human
capital is roughly constant. Throughout this stagnant phase of development
the economy makes several “false starts,” that is, short spurts of growth
associated with temporary reductions in rent seeking. These are triggered
by mild violence shocks (low ρt’s) making the threshold human capital level
10The annual per-capita income growth rate is calculated as (Yt+1/Yt)
(1/25) − 1.T h i s
converges to (βB)
(1/25) −1 on the balanced growth path, which equals about 2.2%, given
how we set β and B.
18fall below actual human capital. In the same manner, they are punctured by
a subsequent severe shock (a high ρt), which pushes the threshold human-
capital level above actual human capital, thus making human capital revert
back to its stagnant level, βA/P, in the next period. Only by experiencing
a series of suﬃciently mild shocks can the economy break out permanently
from stagnation, as the actual human capital levels become high enough to
insulate the economy from even the worst shocks.
The productivity of human capital is given by B(1 − Rtρt); see (2). Its
path is shown in the lower-right panel of Figure 2. Note that the path is
volatile as long as Rt is relatively close to one. Once human capital starts
to grow and Rt goes to zero, human capital productivity stabilizes at the
level B (here set to 5). Likewise, the annualized income growth rate in the
lower-left panel ﬂuctuates around zero until it rises and stabilizes at 2.2%
per year.
5 Resource shocks
In the setting presented thus far changes in the total amount of resources —
that is, the size of the pie for which agents compete, A —h a st w oo p p o s i n g
eﬀects on incomes. On the one hand, a larger pie has a direct positive eﬀect
on incomes as all competing agents get more to share; on the other, it induces
more time allocated to rent seeking, thus reducing productivity in the human
capital sector, leading to lower incomes from human capital.
Next we examine a setting where the size of the pie ﬂuctuates randomly
over time. To this end, we make two simpliﬁcations. First we let the violence
parameter (linking rent seeking to human capital productivity) be constant,
so that we can skip the time index on ρ.
Second, we let both A and P go to inﬁnity, while keeping the ratio A/P
ﬁnite and strictly positive; this ratio can then be seen to equal the parameter
γ as deﬁned in (10). We let this parameter evolve over time according to this
19simple process:
γt+1 = γtεt,( 1 6 )
where εt is uniformly distributed on [ε,ε],a n d0 < ε < ε.
Since γt measures resources per agent the process in (16) has many inter-
esting interpretations. A rise in γt (a high draw of εt) could amount to the
discovery or conquest of new land, or a new resource, or the invention of a
new technology used to harvest the land/resource, or a fall in the population
competing for the land/resource. A fall in γt ( al o wd r a wo fεt)c o u l db ed u e
to the depletion of the land/resource, or a rise in the population competing
for it.
5.1 Equilibrium rent seeking
The preferences and budget constraints are the same as in (3) to (5), so the
model can be solved exactly as in Section 4. The only diﬀerence is that γt
now carries a time index, and ρ does not. Analogous to (8) the expression
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5.2 Income and dynamics
Income is now given by an expression which diﬀers slightly from (11): the
ﬁrst row now becomes γt;a n dt h eﬁrst term in the second row becomes γt/P,
which equals zero (since we let P go to inﬁnity keeping γt ﬁnite). That is, for
























if Ht ≥ b Ht
,( 1 8 )
where (recall again) b Ht = γt/[B(1 − ρ)].
As before, we assume that βB>1, ensuring the existence of a balanced
growth path.
5.2.1 The eﬀects from changes in γt
It is interesting to note that, at any given level of Ht,t h ee ﬀects from a
change in γt on Rt and Ht+1 (and on Yt)d e p e n do nw h e t h e r ,o rn o t ,t h e
economy has entered a stage of development where agents spend some time







=0 if Ht < b Ht
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> 0 if Ht < b Ht
< 0 if Ht > b Ht
,( 2 0 )
where (recall once again) b Ht = γt/[B(1 − ρ)].
In poor economies, where Ht falls below b Ht, agents spend all their time
in rent seeking. Therefore, an increase in γt generates no reallocation of
time between the diﬀe r e n ts e c t o r s ;i to n l yh a sap o s i t i v ee ﬀect on incomes
and human capital investment. When Ht starts to exceed b Ht and agents
spend a positive amount of time in the human capital sector, a rise in γt
induces agents to reallocate more time into rent seeking. The result is lower
productivity of human capital, working through the rent seeking externality
(ρ), which lowers incomes and human capital investment.









=0 .( 2 1 )
That is, resource shocks are neutral on the balanced growth path, where
incomes earned from human capital dwarf those earned from rent seeking.
Our results are therefore consistent with the facts discussed in Section
3.3. In pre-industrial societies an abundance of fertile land, forests, and other
resources constituted the basis for the very existence of civilizations, and the
depletion of those resources led to many civilizations’ collapse (Brander and
Taylor 1998, Diamond 2005).
At intermediate stages of development, as the growth take-oﬀ has just
set in, resource shocks start being detrimental to income. This captures
the presence of a natural resource curse among poor countries today (Sala-
i-Martin and Subramanian 2003, Isham et al. 2005), and in, for instance,
Spain several centuries ago (Drelichman 2005).
Finally, as the economy reaches the most advanced stage of development,
and human capital levels go to inﬁnity, the resource shocks have no eﬀect at
all.
5.3 Transitions
Just like in the setting with violence shocks, the setting with resource shocks
can generate a long phase of stagnant levels of human capital, with occasional
false starts, eventually followed by a transition to sustained growth. To see
how the mechanics work, consider an economy where human capital falls
below the threshold in some period t,t h a ti s ,Ht < b Ht = γt/[B(1−ρ)].S i n c e
income is then given by the amount of resources per agent (that is, Yt equals
γt) in the next period human capital equals Ht+1 = βγt [recall (6)]. Human
capital thus falls below the threshold in period t+1if Ht+1 = βγt < b Ht+1 =
γt+1/[B(1 − ρ)]; and, vice versa, human capital exceeds the threshold if this
























βB(1 − ρ).( 2 2 )
That is, for agents to start reallocating time away from rent seeking the
change in resources per agent (that is, εt)m u s tb es m a l le n o u g h . P u ta n -
other way, the level of resources per agent in the present period must be
small enough, thus ensuring that competition for those resources is not too
tempting; but resources per agent in the preceding period must also be suf-
ﬁciently high to make human capital investment in that period (and thus
human capital levels in the present) high enough to make rent seeking not
too tempting today.
Analogous to (15) we next assume that
ε < βB(1 − ρ) < ε.( 2 3 )
This ensures that a hypothetical economy which is constantly hit by the
most resource increasing shock (ε) is stuck in a stagnant trap with agents
spending all their time in rent seeking, and human capital and per-capita
incomes being stagnant. The same economy being constantly hit by the most
resource reducing shock (ε) instead breaks out of poverty and converges onto
a sustained growth path.
5.4 Simulation results
We next simulate the model letting γt follow the process in (16). We set the
upper and lower bounds for εt to ε =0 .68 and ε =1 .32. This implies that
εt has a mean equal to one; thus, in any period γt is equally likely to grow
as it is to contract.
We let initial resources per agent, γ0, correspond to A/P in the simulation
in Section 4.4, that is γ0 =1 0 0 /1000 = 0.1. We set ρ =0 .6,w h i c hi st h e
average of the upper and lower bounds for ρ used in the simulation in Section
234.4. The remaining parameter values are also chosen as in Section 4.4. In
particular, we set B =5and β =0 .346 so that, if each period corresponds to
25 years, per-capita incomes grow by 2.2% per year on the balanced growth
path. Initial human capital, H0,i ss e tt oβγ0 [cf (18)]. These values imply
that (23) holds, so that a transition to sustained growth occurs sooner or
later.
Figure 3 shows human capital being stagnant for many generations and
then taking oﬀ onto sustained growth at some stage. More precisely, human
capital ﬁrst drifts slowly; in the run shown in Figure 3 the drift is slightly
downwards.11 However, this drift is notably dwarfed by the trend after the
economy has started to exhibit sustained growth.
The stagnant phase continues for about 75 periods, and throughout this
phase the economy displays short spurts of growth associated with temporary
reductions in rent seeking, just as in the simulations in Section 4.4 where ρ
ﬂuctuated. An initial reduction in rent seeking due to a low draw of εt can
be interrupted by a subsequent high draw, generating an expansion in the
pie which agents compete for, and thus inducing a rise in rent seeking. Only
when human capital levels are high enough is the economy insulated from
such shocks.
One diﬀerence compared to the results in Section 4.4 is that both the
actual and threshold human capital levels now ﬂuctuate, since both depend
on the path of γt. T h i si sa l s ow h yt h ea n n u a l i z e dg r o w t hr a t ei sh e r es o
much more volatile during the stagnant phase: resource shocks aﬀect incomes
earned from rent seeking; the violence shocks only aﬀected incomes earned
from human capital.
The most interesting observation shows up in the lower-right panel of
Figure 3, showing the paths of three variables: the gross growth rate of
11This would not be the case if we had speciﬁed a process for γt which exhibits mean
reversion. Such mean reversion typically arises in Malthusian models with endogenous
fertility, where population tends to approach a constant level proportional to the amount
of land and/or the level of technology. The formulation chosen here has the advantage of
generating the simple conditions in (22) and (23).
24income, as given by Yt+1/Yt (not annualized); the resource shock, εt;a n d
the correlation between these two variables over 10 periods (centered on the
latter of the two mid periods).
This correlation coeﬃcient measures the impact of the resource shocks,
and its time path roughly illustrates the time pattern of the natural resource
curse, as described in Sections 3.3 and 5.2.1. As long as Rt =1it holds that
Yt+1/Yt = γt+1/γt = εt, so the gross growth rate and the shock are perfectly
correlated. As rent seeking declines (Rt < 1) the correlation becomes neg-
ative. The correlation goes to zero on the balanced growth path, since the
gross growth rate goes to βB, which is constant and thus uncorrelated with
εt.12 This is harder to see in Figure 3, but in simulations over longer time
horizons the correlation coeﬃcient can indeed be seen to converge to zero.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have presented a growth model where agents divide time between rent
seeking and using their human capital. Rent seeking is modelled as compe-
tition for a non-growing resource, like land; the human capital sector could
be interpreted as trade or manufacturing.
A central element of this model is that rent seeking exerts negative ex-
ternalities on the productivity of human capital. This is modelled in quite
a black-boxed manner, by simply assuming that the productivity of human
capital decreases with equilibrium rent seeking; we discuss and motivate this
further below.
We also introduce a stochastic element: ﬁrst in the form of violence shocks,
capturing variation in how violent forms rent seeking takes; and then as so-
called resource shocks, capturing changes in the size of the pie that agents
compete for.
The ﬁr s tr e s u l tw ew a n tt oe m p h a s i z ei st h ed y n a m i cp a t t e r n st h a to u r
model generate. First of all, the model produces an endogenous take-oﬀ
12See (18) and note that Yt+1/Yt approaches Ht+1/Ht on the balanced growth path.
25from stagnation to growth. That is, the economy can be stuck in a state
of stagnation with low levels of human capital and per-capita incomes for a
long while (several tens of generations in our simulations). Eventually, when
a favorable enough shock arrives human capital rises, simultaneously with a
decline in rent seeking. However, if a reverse shock arrives too soon after
the take-oﬀ the economy can revert back to its initial poverty trap. Only by
experiencing suﬃciently favorable shocks over suﬃciently many periods can
the economy transit permanently onto a balanced growth path. Once human
c a p i t a lh a sr e a c h e dh i g he n o u g hl e v e l s ,a n dr e n ts e e k i n gf a l l e nl o we n o u g h ,
the economy becomes insulated from even the worst shocks.
The transition from stagnation to growth that the model generates is
consistent with the growth take-oﬀ t h a ts t a r t e di nW e s t e r nE u r o p ew i t h
the Industrial Revolution (see, for example, Galor and Weil 2000 and Galor
2005). The several “false starts” that precede the take-oﬀ are consistent with
the rise and fall of, for example, several European city states in pre-industrial
times (De Long and Shleifer 1993, De Long 2000). Moreover, once growth
has taken oﬀ t h ee c o n o m yb e c o m e si m m u n et oe v e nt h ew o r s ts h o c k s ;t h i s
ﬁts with the observation that no OECD country has (yet) crashed back to
pre-industrial income levels.
These patterns arise in a setting with either violence shocks or resource
shocks. The setting with resource shocks generates one additional interesting
result, which ﬁts some long-run facts about the so-called natural resource
curse. At early stages of development, when agents spend time only in rent
seeking, changes in the size of the resource base has only positive eﬀects on
incomes: as the size of the pie that people compete for rises, so does the piece
each agent receives in equilibrium; this is consistent with the observation
that resource endowments, such as forests and fertile soils, constituted the
fundamental basis for the development of early human civilizations. When a
growth take-oﬀ has just set in an increase in resources leads to lower human
capital and per-capita income levels, because it induces a reallocation of
time into rent seeking, and thus lower productivity of human capital; this
26captures the negative growth eﬀects that natural resources have in countries
which have just started to grow, known as the natural resource curse. As
the economy has safely embarked on a balanced growth path, however, the
detrimental eﬀects of resource shocks vanish: as incomes earned from human
capital come to dwarf those earned from resource competition, shocks to
the resource base have vanishingly small impact on incomes; this is also
consistent with the observation that per-capita income gaps across OECD
countries seems to show little consistent variation (negative or positive) with
natural resource abundance.
To sum up, the model replicates a three-stage process in which the econ-
omy evolves from being subject, ﬁrst to a natural resource blessing, then to a
natural resource curse, then to a situation where natural resources are irrel-
evant for living standards. This three-stage process seems largely consistent
with the facts, but has not yet been replicated in previous theoretical work.13
Several of the assumptions driving our results could probably be derived
endogenously in richer frameworks. Most obviously, the negative link from
rent seeking to productive activities could be endogenized. For example, if
productive activities in general were themselves subject to rent seeking, in
the form of taxation or theft, then more rent seeking would lower the reward
to such activities; this would be close to the mechanisms at work in some of
the earlier rent seeking literature, as discussed in Section 2. However, in our
model productive activities — that is, production based on human capital — are
by assumption free from rent seeking. In fact, this is a crucial assumption
of the model, since it drives the mechanism through which human capital
growth generates a substitution away from rent seeking.
13Baland and Francois (2000) set up a model where a resource boom (interpreted as,
for example, a rise in commodity prices) exerts less detrimental (or even positive) eﬀects
in countries with less rent seeking. (See also Torvik 2002.) Baland and Francois also cite
empirical evidence from the 1970’s oil boom supporting this pattern. However, diﬀerent
from us they do not discuss the very ﬁrst stage of development — that is, early human
civilizations — at which an increase in natural resource endowments seems to have exerted
a positive eﬀect in income.
27But there are other ways to interpret the negative externality from rent
seeking to human capital productivity. The endogeneity of institutions is
one. For example, in societies with abundant resources (say land) the most
talented agents may choose to grab as much land as possible and force other
agents to work on it, as slaves or serfs, and build military skills to ﬁght over
land. They would have little interest in building institutions designed to
protect land-less agents living in urban centers. By contrast, in environments
where land is relatively scarce, and competition is intense and lethal over the
little land there is, some talented agents may instead specialize in more skill-
intense activities, like trade. They may then have an interest in using their
talents to build institutions which help enforce contracts and the rule of law,
which would make such activities more proﬁtable.
There may be other and better ways to model this. The point is that,
regardless of what the precise mechanisms are, the negative eﬀects from rent
seeking on human capital productivity could arise also when rent seeking
does not amount to direct expropriation of income from human capital, but
rather competition for some other resource, such as land.
Another element of our model which could be endogenized is the workings
o ft h es h o c k s .T h ev i o l e n c es h o c k sc o u l db et h o u g h to fa sa r i s i n gf r o mc h o i c e s
made by agents as to how violent they act when competing for resources. For
example, there may be more and less violent technologies with which agents
compete for existing resources. Using a violent technology may be more
costly but also result in a greater share of the pie. One starting point could
be the approach taken in our own earlier work, where we endogenize the
choice that agents make about whether, or not, to participate in a conﬂict
(Tangerås and Lagerlöf 2005).
A ﬁnal element which could be endogenized is the resource shocks. Since
these amount to changes in the ratio of total resources over population (A/P),
they could be modeled in a setting where the resource base (A)a n dp o p u l a -
tion (P) evolve endogenously over time, and are subject to stochastic shocks.
The long-run growth literature cited in Section 2 contains many examples of
28related models.
A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium rent seeking
Imposing symmetry (rt = Rt)o nt h eﬁrst-order condition for rt in (7) it is
seen that
(P − 1)RtA
[Rt +( P − 1)Rt]
2 ≥ B (1 − Rtρt)Ht.( 2 4 )
Taking into account that Rt =1if the inequality is strict, this can be elabo-
r a t e do nt og i v e




B (1 − Rtρt)Ht
¾
,( 2 5 )
where (recall) γ =( P −1)A/P 2 [see (10)]. From (25) it can be seen that an




= b Ht.( 2 6 )
This gives the ﬁr s tc a s ei n( 8 ) .F r o m( 2 5 )i ti sa l s os e e nt h a ta ne q u i l i b r i u m
with Rt < 1 must satisfy
Rt =
γ
B (1 − Rtρt)Ht
(27)



































Disregarding the larger root (as discussed in Footnote 7) gives the second
case in (8).
29A.2 Income
Using (8) it easily seen that,













for Rt < 1. Then (27) says that
B (1 − Rtρt)HtRt = γ =
(P − 1)A
P2 (31)
from using the deﬁnition of γ. Using (30) and (31), together with the ex-
pression for income in (3), gives
Yt = A
P +[ 1− Rt]B(1 − Rtρt)Ht
= A



























which is one of the cases in (11).
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Figure 3: Simulations with resource shocks.
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